




Within this work, that was carried out following 
a call for tender by the European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA), the impact of 
cybersecurity threats especially on Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and Flight 
Management Systems (FMS) was assessed. In 
order to do so, simulation studies were carried 
out.  
The German Aerospace Center (DLR) 
operates the research simulator AVES (Air 
Vehicle Simulator) which was used for the flight 
simulation exercises within this project. The 
AVES combines two facilities to simulate 
airplanes and helicopters to the highest 
technical level. The cockpit unit used was a 
complete replica of an Airbus A320. The 
corresponding simulation software (incl. flight 
dynamical models and system simulation) is 
entirely developed at DLR according to the 
official documentation providing full access and 
flexibility in the investigations. The motion 
platform provides a motion system with six 
degrees of freedom, whose motion cueing 
algorithms can be specifically tuned for a given 
task if needed. This unique infrastructure has 
been built during the last years with the aim of 
providing a highly-representative test platform 
for new cockpit functions and flight crew 
training research. 
To assess the impact of cyber-attacks on 
GNSS and FMS, different scenarios were 
developed and ranked by their likelihood of 
occurrence and their expected impact on safety 
and the continuation of the flight. Based on the 
identified threats, realistic scenarios according 
to airline operations were designed and 
implemented into the AVES research simulator. 
Synthetic error models reproducing the same 
effects on the aircraft systems as identified in 
the projects preceding GNSS and FMS threat 
assessment work were integrated into the AVES 
software architecture. In particular, the impact 
of GNSS jamming and spoofing attacks during 
satellite based approach procedures was 
investigated. In addition, attacks on the FMS 
through the open protocol of the Aircraft 
Communications Addressing and Reporting 
System (ACARS) were assessed. 
In this paper, we are going to present the 
results that were obtained during the 
simulations with airline pilots holding Air 
Transport Pilot’s Licenses (ATPL) with a 
special focus on the attacks on the FMS and its 
related systems. We are going to describe the 
simulation setup and the reaction of the pilots 
and we will give pilot training and cockpit 
systems design recommendations in order to 
mitigate risks that stem from the investigated 
threat scenarios. 
1 Introduction  
Cybersecurity threats are of increasing 
importance for aviation. As aviation systems 
(on-board and on the ground) are getting more 
complex and increasingly interconnected, the 
vulnerability to cyber-attacks must be taken into 
account. Currently, European projects are 
focusing on the whole Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) system, e.g. [1]. In addition, some 
activities have been focusing on aircraft systems 
themselves, e.g. [2]. In this work, the primary 
focus is on the impact of cyber-attacks on the 
flight crew. 
IMPACT STUDY ON CYBER THREATS TO GNSS AND 
FMS SYSTEMS 
 
R. Geister, J.-P. Buch, D. Niedermeier*, G. Gamba, L. Canzian, O. Pozzobon ** 
*German Aerospace Center, **Qascom 
 
Keywords: Cyber Security, Flight Management System, Flight Simulation, Human Factors 
R. GEISTER, J.-P. BUCH, D. NIEDERMEIER, G. GAMBA, L. CANZIAN, O. POZZOBON 
2 
The scope of the project encompasses the 
preliminary risk assessment at system and 
aircraft level for potential cyber-attacks to the 
Flight Management System (FMS) and to the 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) 
receiver, including GBAS and SBAS 
augmentations. Furthermore, this work was used 
to assess the impacts of such cyber-attacks on 
the flight crew in simulator trials. 
The work is conducted considering generic 
functional architectures for aircraft systems and 
does not encompass the development of detailed 
system architecture. The assessment covers the 
analysis of potential failure cases and the 
characterization of potential impact for flight 
operations (covering all flight phases), while 
considering the main (existing) mitigations at 
the level of flight crews working methods and 
operational procedures. 
2 Test Setup  
During the project, a security risk assessment 
was carried out for different attacks. The 
methodology used was similar to the 
methodology described in [3] and a proposed 
methodology in [4]. In general, the attacks were 
assessed in terms of attacker capability and 
exposure level of the assets. In our case, the 
assets are the functionalities provided by the 
FMS and the GNSS receiver. 
This assessment led to a likelihood 
assessment of the attack. This likelihood was 
put into context with the safety impact of the 
attack. This classification was similar to the risk 
assessment used in the certification of large 
airplanes [5]. With this methodology, the 
severity of the attacks was ranked. After that, 
we selected some of the high ranked attacks and 
used them for simulator trials with airline pilots. 
2.1 The AVES Simulator  
The AVES simulation is performed on a 
distributed simulation network comprising a 
multitude of computers (see Figure 1). It has a 
centralized communication structure with the 
Interface Computer (IC) being the source and 
destination for all simulation data, i.e. each 
software module gets its input data from the IC 
and returns its computed data to the IC. All of 
the communication except for some 
infrastructural ones is performed using UDP 
connections. 
All simulation software was produced at 
DLR with the overall focus on human factors 
experiments and flight experiment preparation 
mostly dealing with flight performance and 
flight dynamics analyses with DLR’s research 
aircraft fleet. The following list summarizes a 
short statement for all major simulation modules 
used within the basic AVES simulation. 
 
 Aircraft Model: The aircraft model 
containing the flight performance and 
flight dynamics is based on flight test 
data gathered with DLR’s Airbus A320 
research aircraft and resembles the 
aircraft behavior with a high accuracy 
for a wide flight envelope. For research, 
a variety of different aircraft models can 
be used in AVES. However, for the 
experiments conducted within the 
current activity the A320 simulation 
model will be used as it is most suitable 
for this task (commercial transport 
aircraft of the 4th generation). 
 System Simulation: It creates the 
functionality behind all cockpit switches. 
The basic software design consideration 
behind the system simulation was to 
focus on reproducing the correct system 
logic and behavior for the pilot by using 
the official system documentation from 
DLR’s Airbus A320 ATRA aircraft 
(FCOM, FOM, QRH, AMM) augmented 
with comments from DLR’s A320 test 
pilots and data from accident reports that 
sometimes reveal the correct system 
behavior that is opposing to the aircraft 
documentation.  
 Visual System: For the simulation of the 
outside vision a visual database was 
generated using satellite images (taken 
by DLR) on top of a terrain model. The 
visual database contains the area of 
Germany exclusively. 
 Sound Simulation: The sound simulation 
comprises generic transport aircraft 
noise which is augmented by type 
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specific sounds (e.g., warning sounds, 
power transfer unit sound, etc.). 
 Motion System: The motion system uses 
a 6 degree-of-freedom electro-
pneumatically driven Stewart platform 
for simulating forces and is provided 
with acceleration values from the aircraft 
model. 
 Simulator Runtime Environment: The 
runtime environment contains all 
elements that are needed to either let the 
simulation run or control it (e.g., start, 
stop, hold). The Interface Computer (IC) 
that holds and distributes all simulation 
data to all simulation modules or the 
Instructor Operator Station (IOS) are 
two prominent members of the simulator 
runtime environment. 
 
Figure 1: AVES system architecture 
 
2.2 Simulator Scenarios 
In total, seven simulator trials were conducted. 
Each trial was set up as a scheduled flight from 
Munich airport (EDDM) to Hanover airport 
(EDDV). In order to focus on the essential 
scenario flight, the taxi phase is skipped and the 
aircraft was positioned at holding point A13 of 
runway 26R in Munich. The RNAV (GPS) 
standard instrument departure “INPUD2N” was 
used for departure. 
The intended flight plan then contained a 
standard routing to Hannover at a final cruising 
flight level of FL300. For the transition between 
the en-route part of the flight and the approach 
the arrival route “ELNAT4P” is used. 
For the approach in Hanover, a Required 
Navigation Performance (RNP) 0.1 approach 
was specifically designed for these trials and 
implemented in the simulator (see Figure 2). 
This means, that the cross-track error during the 
approach shall be less than 0.1NM in 95% of 
the time. This type of approach was chosen, as 
satellite based approaches are becoming more 
common and RNP0.1 approaches impose high 
requirements on the navigation accuracy and 
integrity. Such approaches are often used to 
avoid terrain which makes the potential impact 
in case of failure very high. 
The weather was utilized as a scenario 
element in the way that for the approach in 
Hanover the weather will mask the position and 
altitude deviations introduced by the GNSS and 
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FMS attack events. In the scenario Hanover is 
chosen to have broken clouds (BKN) with a 
base of 300ft Above Ground Level (AGL). The 
intention behind this is that the flown 
approaches will have a minimum descent 
altitude of 250ft AGL and so visual position and 
altitude deviations will be masked until the 
aircraft breaks out of the clouds close to the 
ground. The weather at the departure airport 
Munich is far less critical with a cloud base of 
3000ft AGL which will also be the global could 
coverage along the whole flight. 
The wind situation was generally calm 
with four to five knots at ground level from a 
westerly direction. The temperature was 
simulated according to the standard atmosphere 
(ISA+0) and therefore there was no need for a 
temperature compensation for the baro-




Figure 2: RNP0.1 approach (dashed line after simulated attack) 
 
2.3 Operational Setup 
For the simulator trials, one airline pilot was 
invited. He was the captain and the pilot 
monitoring on the simulated flight. A member 
of the simulator staff was acting as the co-pilot 
and the pilot flying to create similar behavior 
for all the trials. For one experiment two airline 
pilots were invited to check whether the 
behavior of the actor pilot was comparable 
which it was. The general simulator briefing 
contained information about the experimental 
run, giving a false clue to the pilots about the 
experiments intention and excluding 
cybersecurity matters. Also included in this part 
was a safety instruction for the AVES simulator 
and relevant differences that are to be expected 
in AVES when compared to the real world, 
including a short familiarization flight in the 
simulator. This familiarization flight consisted 
of two ILS approaches onto runway 27R at 
Hanover airport followed by a visual traffic 
pattern. The briefing is performed in the AVES 
briefing room, the familiarization flight is 
performed in AVES. After the familiarization 
flight the crew comes back to the briefing room 
again for the following flight briefing. 
For each simulator trial, a short operational 
briefing was given in form of a Power Point 
presentation. Afterwards, the documents for the 
flight were handed to the pilots. The briefing 
included the departure and destination airports, 
as well as the flight plan. In addition, the 
performance calculation including fuel quantity 
and the weight and balance were presented to 
the airline pilots. 
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The weather briefing was the same for all 
flight trials It was good enough to conduct a 
non-precision RNP approach but bad enough 
not to spot the altered approach path before the 
minimum descent height. 
3 Simulation Results 
3.1 ACARS Loadsheet update 
The threat scenario assumed that an attacker on 
the ground possesses the ACARS addresses of 
multiple aircraft and transmits falsified load 
sheet data via ACARS to the aircraft. On-board, 
the data is received, either by a print out or 
directly in the FMS. The worst condition for a 
take-off would be an aft CG and additionally a 
nose up trim. The elevator of the aircraft would, 
at certain values, lose the ability to pitch down 
the aircraft and that could result in an 
uncontrollable aircraft state. The attack would 
occur during the preflight phase but the results 
would become present in the take-off phase. 




Figure 3: Loadsheet update in the simulator 
trials 
For the attack, it was assumed the aircraft 
has a center of gravity (CG) that is close to the 
backmost allowed position. For the attack a 
falsified W&B with a forward CG was 
generated. This falsified information is then sent 
by the attacker to the aircraft via ACARS. 
Although the computed takeoff weight did not 
changed, due to the falsified weight distribution 
the trim setting is 1.6° up instead of 1.6° down. 
In this situation, the aircraft had a pitch up trim 
setting with an aft CG. This was leading to an 
early pitch up moment of the aircraft during the 
Take-Off roll. This occurred before the rotation 
speed. 
In the simulator trials, this attack was 
simulated in all seven trials. The falsified data 
was accepted in six of those seven cases. It was 
rejected only once.  
3.2 ACARS Flight Plan Update 
For this scenario, it was also assumed that an 
attacker on the ground possesses the ACARS 
addresses of multiple aircraft and transmits 
falsified flight plan data to an aircraft. The 
attacker would need to know the departure and 
the arrival airport and have an idea of the used 
route to tailor the attack to the actual flight path 
but the data is easily obtainable through 
observation. If the pilots accepted the new flight 
plan, the aircraft would deviate laterally from 
the desired path (filed flight plan). 
The attack changed the en-route part of the 
flight plan between two IFR waypoints 
including a change of the proposed arrival route 
that is changed from the original “ELNAT4P” 
to the “GITEX4P” arrival. 
Further, it was assumed that the bogus 
flight plan update was transmitted by the 
attacker via ACARS and printed out on the 
aircraft’s printer.  
This attack scenario was used in two of the 
seven trials. The new flight plan data was 
rejected in both cases. 
3.3 FMS Denial of Service Attacks 
It was assumed that an attacker on board of 
the aircraft is able to access an interface to the 
FMS. The attacker starts a denial of service 
(DoS) attack so that the FMS is not responding 
and freezes at 100% task load. The complete 
functionality is lost. No flight planning via 
MCDU is possible nor is a map displayed. 
Independent navigation systems (VOR, 
DME…) are with backup display systems are 
still available. This situation will lead to an 
increased workload in the cockpit due to 
increased communication activities between the 
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pilots and with Air Traffic Control (ATC). In 
addition, paper navigation and/or ATC guided 
navigation will be required. 
Once the DOS attack scenario was started, 
the MCDU screen was frozen and the system 
did not react to the pilots’ inputs. The map on 
the Navigation Display (ND) disappeared with 
the “MAP” flag showing up in the ND. 
Additionally, both autopilots (AP) and flight 
directors (FD) disengaged and were not 
resettable. 
The DOS attack was triggered during the 
en-route part of the flight. The DOS attack had a 
duration of 180 seconds. This scenario was used 
in two of the seven trials. The effects of this 
simulated attack were detected instantaneously; 
however they were not identified as cyber-
attacks.  
3.3 FMS Database Attacks 
In this scenario, an attacker was able to 
access the servers of a FMS database provider. 
As the approach data (waypoints, altitudes…) 
for RNP or SBAS approaches are stored solely 
on the database on-board the aircraft, an altered 
database poses a threat to the integrity of the 
approach. In our scenario, the final approach 
segment data of one or several approaches are 
altered. Specifically, the data for a RNP0.1 
approach is changed. The attacker was able to 
lower the threshold height so that the glide path 
leads into the ground way before the real 
runway. The aircraft concluded an approach in 
poor weather conditions with a cloud ceiling 
around 250ft. The attacker was able to change 
the data so that the aircraft reaches that altitude 
before the actual runway starts. 
The attacker managed to generate a FMS 
database with a falsified threshold height for the 
approach to runway 27R of Hanover airport. 
The nominal threshold height for this runway 
was 169 ft MSL before the attacker set it to 0 ft 
MSL while leaving the altitude of the final 
approach fix XAVER of 3000ft AGL 
unchanged. This changed geometry leads to a 
potential ground contact approximately 0.5 NM 
in front of the threshold of runway 27R.  
As the corrupted database would have to be 
loaded into the FMS prior to the flight, this 
attack would already have been performed long 
before the actual flight. In the AVES simulator 
the attack is triggered similarly by the way that 
already before the start of the scenario a 
falsified FMS database is loaded into the 
system. The database is an identical copy of the 
nominal AVES simulator FMS dataset, except 
for the threshold altitude of runway 27R of 
Hanover Airport. 
This scenario was used in six of the seven 
simulator trials. Out of those six times the 
effects of the attack were detected by the flight 
crew. Due to the fact that the approach was 
cross-checked by the Pilot Monitoring (PM) 
with the approach chart, the flight crew was able 
to detect the deviations from the desired flight 
path. Only during one simulator trial, this cross-
check was not carried out and therefore, a go-
around was initiated at the decision height as 
visual contact to the runway was not 
established. 
4 Discussion of the results 
The results show, that the investigated scenarios 
are relevant to common airline operations. The 
involved pilots stated that the scenarios were 
realistic in terms of operational procedures. For 
instance, it is not uncommon that pilots receive 
several loadsheet updates before the flight. 
Given the venerable nature of the used data link 
(see also [2]), this threat scenario needs to be 
considered in future applications.  
Within the trials, the loadsheet update was 
accepted six out of seven times and 
subsequently used to change the values in the 
FMS. It has to be stated however, that the test 
setup might have played a role as pilots stated 
that in reality they would have further 
investigated this huge change in the trim setting.  
Regarding the ACARS flight plan update, 
the results show that such an attack will very 
likely not be able to change the route of an 
aircraft in flight as all changes would have to be 
negotiated with ATC. In this work, the flight 
plan update was disregarded in both simulator 
trials. However, it could lead to increased 
workload and voice communication especially if 
an attack on multiple aircraft within a single 
ATC sector is considered. Additionally, digital 
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communication and ATC clearances were not 
considered here. 
The DoS attack on the FMS was not 
identified as a cyber-attack by the pilots. 
However, the effects were noticed 
instantaneously in both cases they were used. 
As soon as the flight crew noticed that the 
aircraft was still controllable and raw navigation 
data was available, the event was handled in a 
routine manner. This is due to the fact that a 
FMS failure is a scenario that is usually trained 
in recurrent simulator training. The pilots started 
interacting with ATC to resolve the situation. 
Therefore, a dangerous situation did not arise. 
However, workload is increased in the cockpit 
and also the required amount of voice 
communication is increased. 
The scenario with the altered FMS 
database was used in six out of the seven 
simulator trials. In five of the six cases, the 
effects of the attack were discovered through the 
cross checking of the altitude with the approach 
charts. The deviation of the flight path was 
discovered and a go-around was initiated before 
the minimum descent altitude. In one case, the 
altitude cross-check was not conducted. 
Therefore, the approach was flown down to the 
minimum descent altitude and there a go-around 
was initiated as no visual contact was made to 
the runway. As a go-around is a standard 
procedure, no critical situation arose from the 
attack. Still, the corrupted database could affect 
multiple aircraft and could lead to congestion 
and an increase of voice communication 
demand. 
Based on the results of the tests and on the 
feedbacks from the involved pilots the 
following list of recommendations should be 
considered in order to implement procedures for 
threat mitigation: 
 The altitude / height cross-check during 
GNSS based approaches (i.e. RNP0.1) is 
a valuable and important safety net, it 
should be strictly enforced and 
considered as a valid safety tool; indeed 
one test showed that without checking 
the altitude the wrong flight path was 
only noticed at the Minimum Decent 
Altitude, whereas in the other tests the 
pilot monitoring checked the altitude and 
was able to identify the deviation from 
the charted path before the MDA which 
led to a go-around at a higher altitude. 
 The altitude / height of the runway 
threshold should be displayed explicitly 
in the FMS in order to be checked in the 
approach briefing; the tests showed that 
the coordinates of the runway threshold 
as well as the height of the threshold 
could not be checked properly 
beforehand. It would be beneficial to 
clearly display the threshold data in the 
MCDU so that it can be cross-checked 
before the approach. That would help to 
identify mistakes at an earlier stage. 
 For ACARS updates, a procedure should 
be considered to ensure the validity of 
the received information, for example 
through an authenticated data 
transmission or by letting the flight crew 
respond to or confirm the changes in a 
secure way. This especially includes 
updates of the flight plan on the ground; 
the tests showed that in the simulator 
environment, the Loadsheet update via 
ACARS was accepted in 6 out of 7 
cases. This means, that there is a lack of 
control possibilities to validate the 
correctness of the update. It was also 
identified that a flight plan update on 
ground could be a dangerous attack as 
this is usually not checked and 
confirmed with ATC. 
 The pilots and ATCO should be trained 
to be aware of the possibility of cyber-
attacks and the effects they could have; 
In general, the pilots did not suspect 
cyber-attacks behind the malfunctions 
during the trials. Therefore, the 
awareness for possible attacks and their 
impact should be intensified. 
5 Conclusion 
Within this work, seven simulated flights were 
performed with airline pilots, emulating several 
cyber-attacks on FMS and GNSS at different 
flight phases. The pilots were invited to the 
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trials under false pretenses in order to obtain 
unbiased results.  
During each flight trial, three simulated 
attacks were conducted. No involved pilot 
associated the experienced effects to a cyber-
attack. Indeed, the pilots were very interested in 
the results afterwards and their awareness in 
cyber-security was increased.  
Most of the considered cyber-attacks were 
not detected by the crew at the time of the 
attack. Miss-detected attacks always led to an 
increased workload of the crew and of the 
ATCO, but they never resulted in critical 
situations during the flight exercises. However, 
the results of the flight exercises are limited to 
the considered flight route scenario and 
statistical considerations cannot be derived 
because of the limited number of tests. In fact, 
some pilots considered certain attacks as 
potentially dangerous in real scenarios. 
Among the considered attacks, the two 
attacks that were considered most critical are the 
“Hacked database” attack and the “GNSS 
spoofing attack”. The “Hacked database” attack 
was discovered five out of six times by the 
monitoring pilots, thanks to the cross checking 
of the actual distance/altitude with the approach 
chart. 
In addition to help in understanding the 
cyber-attacks effects during a flight, test 
exercises performed with real pilots were also 
useful to collect the feedback from the pilots, 
such as the most critical attack scenarios, 
differences in operations/procedures of different 
airlines, and recommendations for threat 
mitigation procedures. The outcomes of the 
trials show that important mitigation procedures 
include altitude/height cross-checks, interaction 
among pilots and ATCO to confirm updates and 
aircraft positions, and pilots and ATCO 
awareness of the possibility of cyber-attacks.  
Even though additional investigations 
should be conducted to derive statistically 
significant results and different scenarios should 
be evaluated to assess the impact of different 
types of attack route and attack configurations, 
even this limited number of simulations 
performed here show the importance for the 
aircraft industry to investigate the impact of 
cyber-attacks on different aircraft systems. In 
particular, putting the pilots “in the loop”, 
analyzing their actions during simulated attacks, 
collecting their feedback afterwards and 
increasing their awareness regarding possible 
effects and attack possibilities appears to be the 
correct path to pursue this investigation. 
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